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**A – Interpretation:**

**Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.**

**B – Definitions**

**Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

**Federal government is the central government in Washington DC**

**Encarta Online 2005,**

**http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite**

United States (Government), **the combination of** federal, state, and local **laws, bodies, and agencies** that is **responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in** [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

**Resolved implies a policy**

**Louisiana House 3-8-2005,** <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

**C – Vote neg –**

**First is Decisionmaking**

**The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.**

Austin J. **Freeley and** David L. **Steinberg** – John Carroll University / U Miami – **2009**, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

**After several days of intense debate,** first **the** United States **House** of Representatives **and** then the U.S. **Senate voted to authorize** President George W. **Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction** as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ **Meanwhile**, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, **a** young **couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their** growing **family or** should **sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools**; elsewhere **a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school,** graduate school, or a job. **Each of these**\* **situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard** to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. **We make countless individual decisions every day**. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. **Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress** and the United **Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making**, **as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶** We all make many decisions every day. **To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶** Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. **At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making**. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶** Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ **Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions.** Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

**Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.**

**Algoso 2011** – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because **organizations matter**. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. **Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person**. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. **Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization**. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. **International development work is no different**. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. **A well-run organization makes better decisions** a**bout staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals**. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. **Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new**. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, **the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical**. Put another way: **the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations**. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. **We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions**. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. **A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world,** and you may even learn how to address them. **But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions**. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

**Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy**

1. **Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.**
2. **Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.**
3. **External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us**

**Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate**

Robert E. **Goodin and** Simon J. **Niemeyer**- Australian National University- **2003**,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long **time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them**. In this circumstance, **the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes** toward the protection of rainforest itself. **The key** point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, **is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions** (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that **we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’**. A consequence of this procedure is that, **when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’** or‘what attitude we take’ toward something, **we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why**. **That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’.** Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that **elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes** in a citizens’ jury-style process. **The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue.** What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

**Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism**

**Keller, et. al,**– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - **2001**

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

**John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse** (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). **Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings"** (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that **learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution** (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, **clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences.** On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that **involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow** in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. **Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.**

**Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink**

**Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011**

**(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications**

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such **as polarization and overconfidence, can** also **be found in group reasoning** (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen **because not all group discussion is deliberative.** According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, **reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur.** As a consequence, “**If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.”** (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. **When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants**, since they share their opinion. **Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion.** In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, **groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint**. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

 2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

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**the rhetoric we use to describe our political strategies is incredibly important. Regardless of intentions, the language surrounding politics has effects that are beyond our control. The affirmative is the latest in a long trend of the use of militarized rhetoric in our everyday lives. The affirmative describes the educational space of this debate as a warzone. To declare “war” on debate is to energize a violent frenzy that creates oppositional politics based on hatred and enemy creation.**

**Stuart 11 – prof of law @ Valparaiso**

(Susan, War As Metaphor And The Rule Of Law In Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have Learned From The War On Drugs, Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 36)

**Rhetoric has long been employed to persuade**, even goad, **people to action. Speakers use powerful words and images to persuade people** to sell a product, **to vote for a candidate, to encourage collective action, to propagandize a political message**, or to follow a religious creed. **Rhetoric is fundamental to the movement of people**, to the indoctrination of the crowd. **Powerful rhetoric** indeed **was required to persuade a reluctant and loosely affiliated group** of colonists **to rebel** against the most powerful country on earth to form a union of states that would protect the right to engage in that rhetoric. However, **the problem posed by much of today’s rhetoric**—on both sides of the political spectrum although primarily on the right3—**is that** public policy **discussions are no longer couched in the pragmatic rhetoric concerning the merits of ideas or solutions** to problems facing the country. **Instead, that rhetoric is couched in terms of war.**¶ **Such militaristic rhetoric has become increasingly common** in advancing public policy agendas, perhaps most notably evolving with Cold War rhetoric in foreign policy.4 **More troubling has become the use of war rhetoric “to elicit public consent** for all sorts of disparate ventures.”5 **For instance, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty was waged** in the 1960s to gain support for sweeping civil rights reforms. The Cold War eventually resolved itself with the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the War on Poverty effected significant civil rights legislation. Both **so-called wars, not real wars** but causes deemed to be just, were resolved favorably to the United States and thereby **confirmed the efficacy of militaristic rhetoric. At the time**, therefore, the use of **such rhetoric seemed justified, not problematic.** World War II was the very recent past, and **we assumed the public understood the distinction between the rhetoric’s metaphorical use** in public policy positions **and its literal use.** We were, after all, still engaged in actual military operations in Korea and Vietnam during the 1950s and 1960s. We thought we recognized that **militaristic rhetoric was a marketing ploy** (pathos) to sell the logic of foreign policy and of social policy (logos). Especially with regard to social policy, we recognized that the **militarized rhetoric was a metaphor for the struggle with an abstraction—civil rights and poverty.** Although violence was an unfortunate outgrowth of the civil rights movement, President Johnson’s **rhetoric was not a declaration of war against a literal enemy.** However, **today’s increasing use of militaristic rhetoric** by politicians and pundits **goes beyond its metaphorical use as a war against an abstraction.** Instead, **the use of such language is becoming literal, and that rhetorical shift matters. Today’s militaristic rhetoric is** increasingly **identifying fellow citizens as enemies in a literal war.** The homology of literal war rhetoric and metaphorical war rhetoric arises from a potent source. **In the modern United States, military images have extraordinary persuasive value**:¶ Collective memory of war, more than any other genre of historical experience, has been central to the public culture of the modern United States as well as to the commercial realm of historical memory. Popular memories of war not only claim to preserve some heroic moment of the past, but they often make acute demands upon the living, who must periodically show themselves worthy of the gifts bestowed upon them by the wartime sacrifices of others.6¶ **At some point**, however, **we** have **crossed the line from** the marketing use of the **metaphorical militarization to actual militarization.** Somewhere in the last thirty or forty years, **we have found it too easy to use militarized rhetoric without examining its consequences.** Nowhere is that easy usage more apparent than in the War on Drugs, especially as it relates to children. What happened to children in the War on Drugs may even be part of the reason why our **current public discourse is reaching a crisis point: A war against an abstraction found an enemy—a defenseless enemy**—and fundamentally changed the rule of law to make engaging that enemy much easier.¶ At its inception, the War on Drugs had a public policy logos to market by its military pathos: The United States had a problem dealing with drug abuse when the War was declared. Hence, the War did not start as an end in and of itself. It was merely the means to curbing an abstract problem, not unlike the War on Poverty. Its **militarized rhetoric did not start out as anything but a rhetorical ploy in changing public perception** and therefore public policy. **From the successes of that marketing strategy has emerged the new militarized rhetoric that has moved the metaphorical to the literal.** Unfortunately, these renewed strategies seem utterly oblivious to the consequences of the abysmal failure that is the War on Drugs. Furthermore, **the rhetoric of the War on Drugs has inured us to the moral implications of using such rhetoric and the personal responsibility that should go with it.** **Without that moral awareness, the new militarized rhetoric is much more dangerous as it becomes less metaphorical and more literal.**¶ Thus, the thesis of this article is that **the larger marketing strategy of** public policy through militarized rhetoric **does have consequences because, ultimately, a specific enemy may be engaged** and war-time exigencies may suspend the rule of law. **Worse, we may have changed our schools into institutions where we teach children that militarized rhetoric is acceptable and without moral consequence.** Part I describes the militarization of the War on Drugs and how and why the U.S. government’s marketing strategy was first employed. Turning schools into literal battlegrounds in the War on Drugs is the subject of Part II. That analysis will examine how all three branches of government actually enabled the War on Drugs by both identifying children as enemies and legally justifying the war against them. Part III then explores the “Americanization” philosophy of the War, a philosophy that has not only contributed to the longevity of the War and turned public schoolchildren into the enemy but also acted as the abstraction that formed the basis of today's militarized rhetoric in the Culture War by painting the War as an “us-versus-them”-style struggle. Part IV then identifies the War on Drugs as one of the direct sources of today’s hyper-militarized rhetoric in which war is both the means and the end of **the marketing strategy** and opines that that War **deafened Americans to the moral implications of war as metaphor** so that we now do have actual war among citizens of this country, the consequence of which may be a fundamental change in the rule of law.

**The affirmative’s militarized rhetoric not only creates enemies and violent politics, it also actively papers over the real violence of militarism. To even begin to compare an academic discussion to the death and destruction of rifles, bombs, and missiles is a rhetorical strategy that actively numbs us to violence, as we accept more and more casual use of the term “war.”**

**Stuart 11 – prof of law @ Valparaiso**

(Susan, War As Metaphor And The Rule Of Law In Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have Learned From The War On Drugs, Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 36)

**Politicians and pundits have become immune to the ethics of war rhetoric. The rhetoric itself is violent, and it breeds violence.** The forty years of **the War on Drugs has demonstrated the success of militarized rhetoric to move this nation to action.** It does not suggest the success of the war itself, but **it demonstrated the power of the marketing tool. It allows pundits and politicians to avoid responsibility by saying: “Everybody does it.”** The War on Drugs has damaged the American culture and it has damaged its democratic genius, the rule of law. But ultimately, **it has made acceptable the idea of being at war with each other.**¶ As the parable of the War on Drugs has taught the people of this nation, **we will target specific enemies** in the cause of an abstraction **when impelled by metaphorical militarized rhetoric.** Those enemies will not be protected by our rule of law. As these abstractions become less connected to facts and pragmatism, **metaphorical rhetoric acquires the tenor of actual call to arms. The subtleties of the distinctions—even if those distinctions exist—are lost on the crowd that no longer recognizes the moral implications of war. Left to its own devices** to preserve itself, **the crowd will select enemies at random, targeting anybody who is not “us”** to preserve itself. **Gabrielle Giffords was specifically targeted** in this Culture War. One can hardly argue that her shooting was coincidence or that mental instability is an intervening cause. **Today’s pundits and politicians no longer have the moral sense to even see the connection.** Maybe **that** blindness **is the most horrifying result of the numbness we suffer from the forty-year drumbeat of the War** on Drugs: “**Regardless of how you try to explain to people** it’s a ‘war on drugs’ or a ‘war on a product,’ **people see a war as a war** on them. . . . We’re not at war with people in this country.”231¶ During its ill-conceived and badly implemented forty-year life, the War on Drugs has made victims of Americans' self-respect, their sense of democracy, and their children. As originally marketed, this War would rid the nation's schools of drugs and drug users, thereby helping schools get back to what they are designed to do—educate children. No one doubts or could credibly argue that drug use and schools do not mix. The problems with the War on Drugs were early apparent, making its longevity somewhat of a mystery. However, **our ability to embrace war as the solution** to a social policy **and** to **ignore the moral ambiguities caused** by such solution **arose from the casual way in which we accept militarized rhetoric as the appropriate frame** for the problem. In so accepting that pathos, we allowed our government to actually engage an enemy who could not fight back and to turn their safe haven into a war zone. If we allow our own children to be targeted, what stops people from declaring war on Members of Congress?

**Their intent is irrelevant --- inclusion of militarized rhetoric corrupts their speech act**

**Sanchez 13 – jd candidate @ Yale Law**

(Andrea Nill, Mexico’s Drug “War”: Drawing a Line Between Rhetoric and Reality, THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 38: 467)

Outside of legal academia, the late Wayne C. Booth—who dedicated his life to analyzing rhetoric—similarly pointed out that **war rhetoric is** essentially **the most influential form of political rhetoric that “makes (and destroys) our realities.”**64 This is because political rhetoric is inherently aimed at changing present circumstances.65 Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson have maintained that **our conceptual system itself is metaphorical and that metaphors** thus **“structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.”**66 Citing the rhetorical use of the term “war,” they note that **the very acceptance of the war metaphor leads to certain inferences and** also **clears the way for political action.**67 **Thus,** the **examples** that follow in this section **should not be merely dismissed as insignificant rhetorical flourishes.** As Lackoff and Johnson warn,¶ **Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions, will of course, fit the metaphor. This will**, in turn, **reinforce the power of the metaphor** to make experience coherent. In this sense **metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.**68

### 1NC Case

**The affirmative’s focus on personal narratives and experiences creates a therapeutic model of debate that merely counsels the individual victims of oppression. This locates the cause of problems and solutions within the self, which invites political inaction and leaves structural causes of oppression untouched as long as we have adopted their method** [found survival strategies for blackness, opened debate up for inclusion of alternative perspectives, etc.]. **This effectively absolves intellectuals of responsibility for racism while allowing it to thrive.**

**Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland**

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

**Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy** also **enables political inaction** in two respects. First, **an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution.** As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, **an unstructured, informal discussion** [End Page 418] **"leaves people with no place to go and** the lack of structure leaves them with **no way of getting there."**70 Second, **the** therapeutic **impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency.** "**Therapy**," Cloud argues, "**offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action.**" Public **discourse emphasizing healing and coping**, she claims, "**locates** blame and **responsibility for solutions in the private sphere.**"71¶ **Clinton's Conversation on Race** not only **exemplified the** frequent **wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform.** In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ **Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens** chiefly **aired personal experiences and perspectives during** the **various community dialogues.** In keeping with their talk-show formats, **the forums showcased** what Orlando Patterson described as **"performative 'race' talk,"** "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, **performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.**73 **Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities"** Clinton also had promised to explore, **including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.**¶ **Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue"** in the name of "responsibility" and "community," **Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional,"** he writes, **"contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium."** More to the point, "**a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."**74 **Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns.** Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. **There was nothing to argue about.**"75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. **Jackson invoked** the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing **suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither** exhaustive **racial data nor concrete goals.** **"The game,"** wrote Jackson, **"is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."**77

**This means the affirmative actively provides fuel to the fire of hegemonic debate practices. As long as the community provides an avenue for self-expression, the issue is resolved. This actively discourages structural solutions to problems of inequality because it makes narrative as a sufficient remedy.**

**Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland**

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, **a communicative model that views public issues through a** relational, **personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction.** **Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is** achieving **an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression.** As Schudson puts it, **"Conversation has no end outside itself."**39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic **paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions** to public problems **by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy.** As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, **"[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal**, and **analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling** . . . **Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign** . . . **[but] only the very limited realm of** therapeutic, **small group interaction.**"40¶ Finally, and related, **a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual**, the **"self-help"** on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic **framing** of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, **provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems** such as disproportionate black [End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, **all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling** defenders of **the status quo** to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

**Their politics of resistance are politically amorphous. They refuse to be tied down to particular strategies and are more concerned with what they stand against than what they stand for. This is a focus on personal empowerment rather than wider social change, which builds up the legitimacy of liberalism by providing venues for the subject to assert him or herself. The affirmative ensures that everyone feels empowered, but nobody actually is.**

**Brown 95—prof at UC Berkeley**

(Wendy, States of Injury, 21-3)

**For some**, fueled by opprobrium toward regulatory norms or other modalities of domination, **the language of "resistance" has taken up** the **ground** vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. **For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment”** that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. **Yet** as many have noted, insofar as **resistance** is an effect of the regime it **opposes** on the one hand, **and** insofar as **its practitioners often seek to void it of normativity** to differentiate it from the (regulatory) nature **of what it opposes on the other, it is** at best politically rebellious; at worst, **politically amorphous. Resistance stands against, not for; it is re-action to domination**, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, **and it is neutral with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way** constrained to **a radical or emancipatory aim.** a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance marks the presence of power and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, this **resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power**. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 **This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive** of power also **reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad** or that which is to be overcome that **it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination.** ¶ If **popular and academic notions of resistance attach**, however **weakly** at times, **to a tradition of protest, the** other contemporary substitute for a **discourse of** freedom—**“empowerment”**—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of idealist reconciliation. **The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges** the extent to which **protest always transpires inside the regime**; **“empowerment,”** in contrast, **registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life** course, **without capitulating to** constraints by **particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment** too often **signal an oddly adaptive and harmonious relationship with domination insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register** implicitly **located on** some- thing of **an other worldly plane vis-a-vis social and political power.** In this regard, **despite its apparent locution of resistance** to subjection, **contemporary discourses of empowerment partake strongly of liberal solipsism—the radical decontextualization of the subject** characteristic of¶ 23¶ liberal discourse **that is key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism.** Moreover, **in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotional bearing and self-regard, empowerment** is a formulation that **converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs in masking the power of the regime.** This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while **the notion of empowerment** articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and economic democracy, contemporary deployments of that notion also **draw so heavily on** an undeconstructed **subjectivity that they risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life.** Indeed, **the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so forms an important element of legitimacy for** the antidemocratic dimensions of **liberalism.**

**The affirmative methodology prioritizes discussions of who holds knowledge rather than what the content of that knowledge is. This makes us more concerned with interrogating social location than working for justice for others. This leads to authenticity challenges and endless searches for purification of identity that preclude effective political strategies. Their focus on the self leads to a shrinking of the moral imaginations that limits politics to what is immediately connected to our personal identities. This standpoint can and should be challenged.**

**Moore 99 – prof @ Cambridge**

(John, with Johan Muller, University of Cape Town “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200)

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of **voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method's social location precludes the need to examine the content of its** data as grounds for valid **explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said.** **This** approach favours an ethnography that **claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the** category--the **'voice'** of membership. What is held to be **the facts**, to be the case, is only so-and **can only be** so-**from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of** incommensurable and **exclusive voices or standpoints.** Through the process of sub-division, **increasingly more particularised identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience** and the knowledge authorised by it. ¶ The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialisation of social categories (see Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way **such** 'knower' **discourses**, ¶ ... **base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower-they celebrate** difference where **'truth'** is **defined by the 'knower' or 'voice'. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged 'knower' becomes smaller**, each strongly bounded from one another, for each 'voice' has its own privileged and specialised knowledge. The client 'knower' group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative ... The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged 'knower', an accretion of adjectives, the 'hyphenation' which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid., p. 17) ¶ As Maton argues, **this** move **promotes a fundamental change** in the principle of legitimation-**from what is known (and how) to who knows it.** ¶ **The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an interior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed** (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). **Since all** such **claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge, 'If you do not believe it you are not one of us'** (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) **that gears down to ever more rarefied specialisations** or iterations **of the voice** category; **an unstoppable** spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the **'shrinking of the moral imagination** [10]. ¶ As Bernstein puts it, 'The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialisation of the discursive rules regulating and legitimising the form of communication' (1990, p.23). ¶ **If categories of** either **agents or discourse are specialised, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the** relations between the categories of which a given **category is** a member are **preserved.** What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) ¶ Collection codes employ an organisation of knowledge to specialise categories of person, integrated codes employ an organisation of persons to specialise categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111). **The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and** further **fragmentation.** In principle, **there is no terminal point where 'identities' can finally come to rest.** It is for this reason that **this position can reappear so frequently** across time and space **within the intellectual field-the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of 'difference'.** In Bernstein's terms, **the organisation of knowledge is**, most significantly, **a device for the regulation of consciousness.** ¶ **The pedagogic device is thus a** symbolic **ruler of consciousness in its selective creation**, positioning and oppositioning **of pedagogic subjects.** It is the con- dition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. **The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness?** (1990, p. 189) ¶ **The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories** and their relations **can be strongly theorised and** effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary **and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.**

## 2NC

### Organizational Decision Making 2NC

#### There is no effective war machine without organizational decisionmaking skills –Ideology isn’t enough for a revolution – successful organizational policymaking is a prerequisite to broad based support for overthrowing the government

Goodwin and Skocpol 1989 - professor of sociology at New York University AND professor of political science at Harvard (December, Jeff and Theda, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World” Politics and Society, 17(4), 489-509, Google books)

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that revolutionary movements are much more than simply ideological movements. As Popkin and Wickham Crowley have recently argued, revolutionary movements have won broad popular support when they have been willing and able to deliver state-like collective goods to their constituent. One such collective good is the establishment of “liberated areas”; secure from attack by the incumbent regime, whose repressive actions could ensure popular acquiescence with otherwise unappealing armed revolutionaries able to provide little more than a modicum of protection. In addition, the collective goods provided by revolutionaries may also include public education, health services, law and order, and economic reforms such as tax and interest reductions, the elimination of corvee labor, and land reform. Popkin notes that revolutionaries have been particularly effective in winning popular support when they have initially focused on “ local goals and goods with immediate payoffs” before attempting to mobilize the population for more difficult tasks-including, ultimately, the overthrow of the incumbent regime. In Vietnam, for example, peasants “in the late 1960s still laughed about the early attempts by young Trotskyites and Communists to organize them for a national revolution, for industrialization, or even for a world revolution! Only later, when peasants (and workers) were organized around smaller and more immediate goals, were larger organizational attempts successful.”; 11 During the 1960s, a number of Latin American revolutionary groups, which attempted to replicate the Cuban Revolution-including the Sandinistas of Nicaragua-failed to make headway, largely because they were too quick to engage incumbent regimes in armed struggle, well before they had solidified broad popular support through the provision of collective goods. In addition to collective goods, revolutionary organizations may also offer selective incentives to encourage participation in various sorts of activities, particularly dangerous ones like actual guerrilla warfare. Such incentives for actual or potential cadres and fighters, and their families, may include extra tax or rent reducti ons or an additional increment of land beyond that allocated to supporters in general. In any event, it is the ongoing provision of such collective and selective goods, not ideological conversion in the abstract, that has played the principal role in solidifying social support for guerrilla armies. The argument we have just made does not, however, support Tilly's claim that the sudden withdrawal of expected government services drives people to revolt." In many Third World countries, few government services have ever been provided to the bulk of the population. In fact, the evidence suggests that those governments that do not deliver collective goods to people, and then repress reformers who try to do something about the absence of such services, are the governments most likely to generate support for revolutionaries. This analysis, moreover, accords with what we are beginning to learn about ruling revolutionary parties. Walder has recently shown that such parties obtain popular support or compliance not simply through coercion or through impersonal ideological appeals to atomized individuals (as the "totalitarian" image would have it), but through patronage and the development of networks of loyal clients.14 Revolutionary movements that have to build social support over a long period of time operate in a similar way. In terms of what they are actually doing (and not simply what they are saying), revolutionary movements can usefully be viewed as proto-state organizations, or what Wickham-Crowley calls "guerrilla governments."15 The presence of revolutionary movements offering collective services in territory claimed by the official state implies a situation of "dual power." in Trotsky's classic phrase.

### AT: You Exclude Us

#### The uncompromising ideology of the affirmative creates greater exclusion than it solves

Knight, Professor of Education at LaTrobe University, 2k

(The Urban Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, Democratic Education and Critical Pedagogy, link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1005177227794.pdf)

It is difficult for critical pedagogy to encourage the oppressed to traditional academic success, because that would be the equivalent of seducing the oppressed into accepting ideological premises that contribute to and sustain oppression. That they exempt themselves from such seduction has already been noted. Critical pedagogy, by hiding behind hegemony, embraces an unacceptable excuse for failure to learn. It finds curriculum to be alienating and useless, but no viable alternative is proposed. The importance of meaningful relationships between students and teachers is recognized, but what is proposed is vague and is expressed in secret code.

Critical pedagogy has its own brand of exclusiveness. It is an exclusiveness that is the consequence of a nonnegotiable ideology: The major consequence of this kind of uncompromising determinism is that it leaves insufficient space for the role of reflexivity in the process of practical change. (Carr, 1995, p. 113) The frenzied focus of critical pedagogy on eradication of sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia instead of working together to negotiate an inclusive community may contribute to the very problem that it ostensibly opposes: There are prevailing asymmetries of power, not just between teacher and student, but among students themselves, and it is in [sic] the playing out of these asymmetries which can lead quickly to the expression of the very “isms” which the teacher seeks to educate away. “Teaching the conflicts” . . . may produce more conflict. (Harley, 1997, p. 91) When it comes to language—which is curious because in the growing volumes of critical pedagogical literature there is recognition of how language is used to include and exclude—nobody excludes better than critical pedagogues.

## 1NR

### War Rhetoric

**And it’s empirically a good method for social change**

**Cady 10** (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 94-96)

Turning to more genuine objections to pacifism, **the vast majority** ¶ **of standard criticisms are** variations of **“Be realistic.”** These tend to be ¶ expressed with remarks such as, “Pacifism sounds good but it just won’t ¶ work,” **or “I agree in theory but not in practice.” Since practical objections can only be resolved by** reference to **empirical evidence**, it is at ¶ this point that **the long history of nonviolent direct action needs to be** ¶ **known. People tend to think pacifist action will not work because they** ¶ **are** largely **ignorant of where and when it has worked. In fact, nonviolent direct action has been** an **effective and widespread** means of social ¶ change, defense of rights, resistance against invasion, improvement of ¶ economic conditions, and overthrow of dictators. **While a thorough history of nonviolent direct action cannot be included here, brief sketches** ¶ of selected successful pacifist direct actions **are helpful**.1¶ **Examples of effective** use of **nonviolent** direct **action can be documented** at least **as far back as** fifth century B.C.E. **Rome**. Evidence is ¶ scattered but “nonviolent action certainly occurred between Roman ¶ times and the late eighteenth century, when the case material be-¶ comes rich.”2 While many effective **nonviolent actions are** familiar, ¶ many more are **neglected in our school history texts, or their significance is overshadowed by detailed accounts of battles, tactics, and** acts ¶ of **military heroes**. Some effective nonviolent actions are recounted ¶ with little recognition that they fostered major social change without ¶ resort to violence. **Instances** of effective use of nonviolent direct action ¶ from early American history **include** organized **colonists challenging** ¶ **British rule by economic resistance, abolitionist struggles** against ¶ slavery **through boycott of slave- labor- produced goods and** support of runaway slaves via **the Underground Railroad, the struggle for women’s suffrage through protest, civil disobedience, and tax resistance, as** ¶ **well as** numerous **strikes, boycotts**, slow- downs, **and protests** characterizing the defense of workers’ rights **in the labor movement.** Similar ¶ examples can be drawn from the histories of many other nations.¶ To a large extent, nonviolent means of struggle have replaced physical attacks, riots, and killings as means of social and economic reform, ¶ but **we** now **take** these **nonviolent methods for granted** as appropriate ¶ means for redress of economic and social grievances. Unfortunately, ¶ **we rarely recognize the role of nonviolent activists** in the transformation of culture from violent to nonviolent means in achieving social and ¶ economic justice. **When faced with the objection “it won’t work,” the** ¶ **pacifist response must be, simply, that nonviolent action does work and** ¶ **has a history to document the claim**.¶ **Serious critics of pacifism press further, objecting that** while **a few** ¶ **instances of** effective use of **nonviolent** direct **action** have occurred, ¶ they **are exceptional cases. To respond to this, pacifists need only underscore the innumerable cooperative acts undertaken routinely every** ¶ **day by the vast majority of people** within any functional society. When ¶ this point is granted, the objection turns to require examples not from ¶ domestic conflict over economic or social grievances but instances in ¶ which nonviolent struggle is “a major or predominant means of defense ¶ against foreign invaders or internal usurpers.”3 Here again history ¶ provides examples of successful nonviolent actions. They include:¶ German strikes and political noncooperation to the 1920 Kapp ¶ Putsch against the Weimar Republic; German government- ¶ sponsored noncooperation in the Ruhr in 1923 to the French ¶ and Belgian occupation; major aspects of the Dutch anti-Nazi ¶ resistance, including several large strikes, 1940– 45; major aspects of the Danish resistance to the German occupation, including the 1944 Copenhagen general strike, 1940– 45; major ¶ parts of the Norwegian resistance to the Quisling regime and ¶ the occupation, 1940– 45; and **the Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet** invasion and **occupation**, 1968– 69.4¶ It must be kept in mind that in **these** cases **nonviolent actions were** ¶ **undertaken with** success yet with little or **no preparation, training, or planning. Of course the Czechoslovak resistance ultimately** ¶ **failed, “but it held off** full **Soviet control for eight months . . . which** ¶ **would have been utterly impossible by military means**.”5 **We can** ¶ only **speculate how much more successful nonviolent defense might be were nations to prepare for it with commitments of resources** ¶ and energy at levels **comparable to** current **investments in military** ¶ **defense.**

**Our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence**

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

**Lawrence 9** (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that **war can destroy everything of value.**" Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) **As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem.** We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. **In the** [**United States**](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h)**, solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine** and empire, **it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens**. **We are conditioned to see war as the solution to** major **social ills and** major **political disagreements.** That way **when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites** mind and body **and creates a fear mentality** that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. **But is this war mentality working for us?** In an age when **nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine** and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. **Our society is dripping violence**. The violence is **fed by poverty, social injustice,** the break down of family **and** community that also arises from **economic injustice**, and by the managed media. **The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for** nearly **all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values** and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. **War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why** more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the **other wars around the planet** in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power **will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse.** As mentioned previously, **the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science** and **technological** resources along with **economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity,** ¶ **instead of maintaining the power positions of the** very few **super wealthy.** So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. **Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live.** **As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives**. **When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.**

**The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence**

* Democracy itself is the product of searching for peaceful solutions

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**Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence**—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? **Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security?** Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ **Humanistic thinkers** approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They **examine** in depth the **root causes of** these **problems**, warning about the consequences of escalation **and**, at the same time, **indicating** the prospect of their **possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by** Immanuel **Kant,** Leo **Tolstoy,** Mahatma **Gandhi,** **M**artin **L**uther **K**ing**, and many contemporary philosophers**—supported by peace and civil rights movements—**counter** the paralyzing **fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the** solutions to the **problems**, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ **Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War,** which polarized the world, **power politics was challenged by the** common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and **the ethics of peace.** Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-**intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of** "new thinking," aiming for **peace, freedom, and democracy.** **Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative.** In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, **peaceful projects emerge** each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, **as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity.** **The** new **thinking** in philosophy **affirms the supreme value of** human and nonhuman **life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the** transcendental task of the **survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests** of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, **it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons** and from **war and organized violence.**44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, **it calls for** the **democratization** of international relations and for **dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems.** It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ **The escalating global problems are symptoms of** what might be termed **a** contemporary **civilizational disease**, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, **the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on** whether or not **humankind** will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. **Hence the need for** a new philosophy of humanity and **an ethics of nonviolence** and planetary co-responsibility **to help us make sense** not only of our past historical events, but also **of the** extent, **quality**, **and urgency of our present choices.**